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Abstract
The principle of laicism has been one of the main pillars of the state-building process of Turkey. Laicism in Turkish context 
was held through incorporation of religious institutions into the state apparatus. Starting with the 1990s parties with 
Islamist background have gained political power and found their way into government. With some reflections on the 
historical evaluation of Turkish politics, this article accommodates western oriented theories of state-building suggested 
by prominent scholars such as Charles Tilly and Stein Rokkan, and Barkey’s complimentary model of state formation 
for non-western societies. The key objective of this article is to scrutinize the relationship between the state and religion 
during the old and the new state-building processes of Turkey. This study provides systematic empirical evidence to the 
argument that Millennium has witnessed a well-organized counter state-building process carried on by the government 
of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). 
Introduction
The leading scholars of state-building literature explain 
state-building as a three-fold process; first coercive 
penetration or pacification of rivals, second standardi-
zation and homogenization of the public and last, ac-
commodation of specific groups or power blocs (Tilly 
1975; Rokkan 1975; Van de Walla and Scott 2009) . On 
the other hand, Barkey (1994) states that the nation-
building process of a country may also include incor-
poration of rival bodies into the rule of state by creating 
new institutions to neutralise and regulate their power. 
The nation-building of Turkey can be explained by us-
ing these two roots of literature as it first started with 
elimination of internal rivals such as sultanate and ca-
liphate, but it also included and aimed to subordinate 
ethnic and religious identity of people and glorified 
one and unique identity of being a Turk. On the other 
hand, the government of Turkey incorporated the main 
rival, religious authorities, into the state apparatus step 
by step and subsequently, on a certain level prevented 
possible reaction of the opposition groups to these in-
stitutional changes. However, despite the ban on reli-
gious fraternities, religious organizations have never 
been ended completely and some of these religious 
groups have been organized to become political pow-
ers after the 1980s. The main argument of this study is 
that nowadays there is a well organized contra state-
building project in Turkish politics, aiming to pacify the 
main rivals in order to increase the role of religion in the 
political sphere. This new stream of state-building pro-
cess started with the new millennium and has demon-
strated some similarities with the secular state-building 
of Kemalists in terms of its strategies for pacification of 
the internal rivals and oppositions, as well as accommo-
dating specific groups in the state agencies. 
In light of the historical explanations, this article ex-
plains the relationship between religion and politics in 
the state-building process of Turkey and its impact on 
today’s political situation. There are two main research 
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questions posed by this article; firstly, how religion and 
state have intertwined in the establishment of the Turk-
ish Republic and secondly, how has the relationship be-
tween religion and state affected current political dy-
namics of Turkey? The time period of the analysis spans 
from the establishment of the Turkish Republic (1920s) 
to present (2011). The article is structured around the his-
torical flow of events. In the first part of the article, the 
theoretical framework of the paper is outlined. In the sec-
ond part, the main dimensions of the Kemalist ideology 
and the understanding of secularity in this ideology are 
clarified. The third section analyses changing dynamics 
of the single and multi-party regimes from the 1920s to 
the 1990s. The fourth part examines the AKP govern-
ment and its actions during the 2000s. The article con-
cludes with contextual and theoretical reflections on the 
current conjuncture of Turkish politics. 
Theorizing State-building
The term state-building was first used by Charles Tilly 
(1967) in his prominent work “The Formation of Nation-
al States in Western Europe”, referring to the develop-
ment of modern European bureaucracies from the 17th 
to the 18th centuries. Even though the terms of state-
building and nation-building have been occasionally 
used interchangeably by scholars, according to Van de 
Walla and Scott (2009) there is a clear distinction be-
tween these two concepts. While state-building refers 
to “interventionist strategies to restore and rebuild the 
institutions and apparatus of the state”, nation-building 
refers to “the creation of a cultural identity that relates 
to the particular territory of the state” (Van de Walla and 
Scott 2009: 7). Having this differentiation in mind, in this 
article the term of state-building is used with regard to 
the theoretical and conceptual characteristics framed 
by Charles Tilly and Stein Rokkan.
Even though some scholars such as Barnett (2002: 105) 
argue that “there are many paths towards state for-
mation”, Tilly (1985) argues that states carry four main 
activities. First, war-making and state-making actions 
take place. These activities include elimination or neu-
tralization of the powerful rivals outside and inside the 
territories. Second, the action of protection is charac-
terized by elimination or neutralization of the enemies 
of their clients. Lastly, the so-called extraction includes 
gaining the resources of carrying out the first three ac-
tivities—war making, state making, and protection. All 
these activities have required states to create modern 
bureaucracies, and introduce systematic taxation that 
caused resistance from the population. As a result states 
expanded the agencies and institutions to maintain do-
mestic political order.
Going more in depth into these processes, Tilly (1992; 
1999) emphasizes a process of coercive penetration 
of the state by the use of violence, elimination, and 
neutralization of internal rivals. The building of states 
cost European states enormous “death, suffering, loss 
of rights and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or la-
bour” (Tilly 1975:71). It required elimination and sub-
ordination of many rivals inside as well as outside the 
territory. Tilly particularly focuses on taxation and food 
supply policies as structures of extraction and dem-
onstrates that there was a violent resistance from Eu-
ropean populations to the creation of strong states. In 
this context, Migdal (1988) also argues that local lead-
ers should be considered as ‘strong men’ who are the 
biggest challenge to the state leaders by utilizing their 
socially structured powers. Particularly the multiplicity 
of local authorities such as landlords has resulted in a 
great extent of rivalry and resistance against state mak-
ers. In such an anarchical atmosphere, Tilly (1975) puts 
a special emphasis on the role of war in state-building 
activity and argues that war makes the state. In this pro-
cess the formation of standing armies has played a par-
ticular role as “the largest single mean of state coercion 
over the long run of European state making” (Tilly 1975: 
73). As a result of this specific and crucial role attributed 
to the army, European countries have acquired more 
freedom in intervening in domestic politics.
On the other hand, having and sustaining resources 
to subsidize militaries for the war against rivals and to 
maintain governmental activities have been a difficult 
task for states. More extensively used strategy for ex-
tracting such activities was the fiscal apparatus such 
as taxes on trade etc. (Tilly 1985) However, many schol-
ars criticize Tilly’s explanations about the relationship 
between war-making and state-making arguing that 
this model do not always fit to Third World Countries 
(Schwarz, 2004; Sorensen, 2001). Schwarz (2004) argues 
that war-making did not lead to a creation of Tillyan 
understanding of strong states which are effective, le-
gitimate and centralized, in Arab Middle East. Accord-
ing to Schwarz (2004) there are no strong states in the 
region in terms of their tax collection and the degree 
of militarization and he suggests that countries’ level of 
rentierism is the main determinant of the emergence of 
institutionally weak states in Arab Middle East.
Secondly, the standardization and homogenization 
of people takes place through utilizing public servic-
es such as public education and mass media. Riggs 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.1, No. 1, June 2011
©IdPS
82
ISSN 2039-8573 online
(1997) describes this phase as a process in which the 
state policies are used as the main features to create 
a nation. This process includes creation of a national 
identity with common cultural manifestations such as 
religion and language. In these processes, protection is 
provided by established institutions such as courts and 
representative assemblies (Tilly 1985). The strategy of 
homogenization is particularly important because ho-
mogeneous populations are more likely to remain loyal 
to a regime of its own kind as well as more likely to fight 
against foreign domination (Tilly 1975). In heterogene-
ous populations there is a high risk of a policy failing in 
some communities whereas being successful in others. 
In homogeneous societies, the resistance to central-
ized policies of extraction and control is minimized as 
their style of life will be relatively similar to each other. 
Tilly (1975: 44) argues that “the failure to homogenize 
increased the likelihood that a state existing at a given 
point in time would fragment into its cultural subdivi-
sions at some point in the future”. However, some schol-
ars (Migdal 1988) demonstrate that some countries 
such as Egypt with homogeneous and bureaucratized 
societies were not able to build a strong state because 
strong societies may prevent those states’ capacity to 
centralize social control. In this context, homogeneous 
societies may face other circumstances, under which 
they will be more likely to oppose the central power by 
mobilizing their social, religious, or traditional links and 
common interests. 
Having a similar approach to Tilly, Rokkan (1975) pro-
pounds four time phases for state-building of European 
countries. The first phase; initial stat- building, includes 
cultural, political, and economic unification of the elite 
(Rokkan 1975). In this phase states establish institutions 
to maintain internal order and to provide common de-
fence facilities. The second phase; standardization, is 
characterized by strengthening of national identity at 
mass level by using features such as conscript armies, 
mass media, education system. In this phase emerges a 
“widespread feelings of identity with the total political 
system” which are most probably conflicting with the 
existing identities (Rokkan 1975: 572). The third phase; 
participation, includes extension of political represen-
tation by allowing people to access a political system. 
In this phase new channels such as creation of new po-
litical parties are opened to furnish mass participation. 
The fourth and final phase, redistribution, refers to the 
period in which states expand their social rights by in-
creasing the number of agencies of redistribution and 
public welfare services. This phase is characterized by 
an extension of administrative machinery for the terri-
torial state through the development of policies such 
as progressive taxation. 
Additionally, Rokkan’s famous four point cleavage 
theory offers two important revolutionary steps in the 
state-building of European countries. The National 
Revolution produces two-cleavage structures. Firstly, 
the centre periphery cleavage refers to “the conflict 
between the central nation-building culture and the 
increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or 
religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces 
and the peripheries” (Rokkan 1970: 102). The second 
cleavage refers to the conflict between the long-es-
tablished and privileged institution of the church and 
the state’s activities to centralise, standardise, and mo-
bilise the nation-state. On the other hand, the Industrial 
Revolution produced two other cleavage structures. 
The third cleavage addresses urban and rural differ-
ences and refers to “the conflict between the landed 
interests and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs” 
(Rokkan 1970: 102). Lastly, the owner-worker cleavage 
refers to “the conflict between owners and employers 
on the one side and tenants, labourers, and workers 
on the other” (Rokkan 1970: 102). As this article focuses 
more on National Revolution of Turkey, I will go more in 
depth in the explanations of first two cleavages.
First of all, on the subject of the centre periphery re-
lations, the centre has a strong position in which it 
controls all the transactions among actors in the ter-
ritory. There are three sets of relationships between 
centre and periphery. First, military-administrative sys-
tem building includes the spread of new people into 
new territories by using physical coercion. This phase 
includes the organization of new army and police forc-
es and creation of new administrative agencies. Pub-
lic officers and bureaucrats are mostly involved in this 
process and peripheral communities respond to these 
actions with some resistance and counter mobilization 
(Rokkan et. al, 1970). Secondly, economic system build-
ing refers to ‘penetration of commodities and services 
into new territories’ by using exchange of goods and 
money (Rokkan et. al, 1970: 118). Lastly, cultural system 
building includes penetration of norms into new ter-
ritories by using scripts. In this phase, local religions, 
churches and schools are organised by the elites such 
as priests, scientists and scribes. Linguistic, religious and 
ideological standardisation is imposed by central pow-
er through the peripheral community which demands 
to maintain its distinctive identity. However, this cleav-
age structure cannot be considered free from critiques. 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.1, No. 1, June 2011
©IdPS
83
ISSN 2039-8573 online
Migdal (1988) finds this dichotomous distinction of so-
cieties problematic as he argues that societies are com-
posed of various kinds of social organizations and state 
is only one of those institutions, which wants to have 
social control over the society. Similarly, Braddick (1991) 
finds it extremely short-handed to consider state as the 
centre. He argues that in the process of state formation 
states can be considered only as “a part of a network of 
local social relationships” (Braddick 1991: 4)
Turning to the cleavage of church and the state, Rokkan 
emphasizes the contradiction between the corporate 
claims of the churches and the state’s will to control 
moral community norms. Besides the fundamental is-
sue of the control of education, these two have long 
been in conflict over the issues such as marriage and 
divorce, functions of medical and religious officers and 
organisation of funerals (Rokkan 1970). Particularly, the 
establishment of compulsory education by the state 
has caused a strong resistance from the religious insti-
tutions and resulted in mass movements. The expan-
sion of secularization and rationalization movements 
has subordinated the fundamentalist trends. In light 
of these explanations, Rokkan argues that Reformation 
and Counter Reformation have brought a momentous 
division of state-religion relations in Europe. In the pro-
cess of Reformation, the struggle to take the control of 
religious organizations has taken place. These struggles 
have generated different results in different contexts. In 
Southern and Central Europe the Counter-Reformation 
consolidates the position of church and the privileged 
bodies of the ancient regime gain authority over the 
church. As a result, a high polarization of politics has 
arisen between the national-radical-secular move-
ment and the catholic-traditionalist movement (Rok-
kan 1970). However, in Southern and Central Europe 
Counter Reformation opposition to the regime was not 
hostile to the teachings of the Church. First of all, the 
cultural integration of the nation has taken place and 
then the church has found its way in the new political 
order (Rokkan 1970: 117).
On the other hand, Barkey (1994) criticises the state 
formation theories of Tilly and Rokkan by arguing that 
they only characterise western patterns. She presents a 
non-western model of state-building by analysing the 
case of the Ottoman Empire. She aims to build a more 
explanatory theoretical model which could be capable 
of explaining non-western styles of state-building. Bar-
key argues that the Ottoman Empire used other means 
such as bargaining or negotiating with bandit armies 
rather than of coercion. However, this argument can be 
questioned considering the period of single party rule 
of Turkish Republic (1923-1950). Kuru argues that “the 
secularists never saw Islamists as a negotiation partner” 
during single party rule (2004: 10). Barkey further argues 
that to control the rivals and social classes, the Ottoman 
Empire manipulated most of the classes in the society 
and incorporated those forces into the central state 
mechanism. Even though in the west, countries have 
been successful in building a centralized state through 
using the monopoly of coercion, it is not always neces-
sary that this will be the way in each country. The 17th 
century Ottoman Empire witnessed different control 
mechanisms, including “low level of militarization in the 
country side” or “internal warfare with large scale ban-
dits” (Barkey 1994: 231). In this context, Barkey criticises 
the assumption that the revolts are part of the state 
formation process. According to her, the study of the 
revolts requires to scrutinize state-society relations by 
taking the social structure of society and centralization 
of state policies into account. In this process “state se-
lects a course of action that weights the structure of so-
ciety against state goals, and society is shaped and re-
shaped through action and reaction” (Barkey 1994: 231). 
This dynamic relationship between state and society is 
the core in the difference of the existence of rebellion 
between western and non-western world. Contrary to 
many European states, the Ottoman Empire was able to 
subdue each social class accompanied by the relative 
weakness of the social structure allowing a relatively 
easier communication and organisation in the rural ar-
eas. As a result, rebellion activities were minimised.
Kemalism as an official ideology of the new Republic
The Turkish Republic was established after the Inde-
pendence War which was held against the occupying 
forces of the Allies after the First World War. High respect 
by the elites and average citizens provided Mustafa Ke-
mal Atatürk1 with the legitimacy and power to become 
the founding father of the Turkish Republic. Atatürk also 
demonstrated outstanding political leadership skills in 
the building of a modern nation state. He had carefully 
developed a series of principles such as pragmatism, 
secularism, national sovereignty and empirical state 
controlled economy and processed a number of re-
forms in order to reach his main aim; modernization of 
the Turkish society.
1 The Grand National Assembly of Turkey has given to 
Mustafa Kemal the last name of Atatürk on 24 November  1934 
after the Law of Family Names came into force on 21 June 1934.
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So called Kemalist ideology grounded its state-building 
project on three main pillars: 1) nation-building 2) west-
ern style modernization 3) separation of state and reli-
gion.
Looking back to the times of the Ottoman Empire, the 
idea of national identity as being a citizen of the Otto-
man Empire did not exist because of the multicultural 
and multi-national characteristics of the Empire. Under 
the leadership of Atatürk, Turkey had two difficult tasks 
in building a nation-state: first to develop a western ori-
ented society and second, to create a national identity 
(Kılıçbay and Binark 2002: 496).  In this context, the au-
thority of religion in the ruling of the state and in the 
daily lives of people was seen by Atatürk as a sign of 
backwardness and antithetical to progress. As a result, 
disestablishment of religion from the state apparatus 
played a central role in the state-building of Turkey. 
During this process, Islamic law was replaced with Eu-
ropean law and many revolutionary steps were taken. 
The creation of a national assembly and the abolish-
ment of Sultanate and Caliphate paved the way to the 
creation of a secularized state with the ruling power of 
the Grand National Assembly2.Thus, the authority of 
religion and sultan/caliphate was eliminated and the 
Islamic religious communities have been integrated 
into the framework of nation and represented in the 
parliament. The understanding of Islamic community 
so called cemaat created an unconscious support for 
the perception of a nation in Turkish society (Mardin 
2001). Article 1 of the first temporary constitution of 
Turkey stated that ‘Authority, without any condition and 
reservation, belongs to the nation’ (Constitution of Re-
public of Turkey 1921). The terminology of nation was 
not clear in the minds of people that may allow them 
to replace the meaning of it with the understanding of 
cemaat (Mardin 2001). The glorification of Turkish iden-
tity over religious or ethnic identities was the main aim. 
Thus, sub-identities caused by the multi-ethnic nature 
of the Ottoman Empire were to be subordinated to the 
everlasting unity of the Turkish society. 
To prevent the new government from being labelled 
anti-religious, Islam was declared the official religion 
of the state (First and Second Constitutions of Turkey 
1921/1924). However, religion was disestablished from 
the constitution in 1928, and in 1937 it was replaced 
with the statement that Turkey is a republican, nation-
alistic, populist, statist, secular, and revolutionist state 
2 The usage of the word ‘Grand’ is seen as a political ge-
nius by Serif Mardin (2001) as it emphasize the pure authority of 
the nation in the ruling of it.
(Constitution of Republic of Turkey, 1924, Ammend-
ments to Art.2). These six founding principles reflect the 
basis of the creation of the Republic, however, the prin-
ciple of secularism will be focused in the following part 
as it has a fundamental role in the context of this article. 
The Meaning of Secularism in the Republic: Laicism
The term of secularism has particular dimensions in the 
context of Turkey. Scholars argue that the perception 
of secularism in Turkey is different than its Anglo-Saxon 
conceptualization, which refers to separation of church 
and the state (Kılıçbay and Binark 2002: 496; Hocaoğlu 
1998). Kılıçbay and Binark (2002: 496) described the 
concept of secularism for the Turkish Republic as di-
dactic secularism, which emphasizes “moralistic and 
pedagogical” characteristics as well as it includes a 
“controlling and teaching mechanism”. In other words, 
the nation state aimed to regulate and administer reli-
gious practices and institutions. Kuru (2005) identified 
Turkish secularism as assertive secularism in which the 
state promotes secularism as a doctrine in regulating 
the public sphere and aims to limit the practice of re-
ligion to the private sphere. The first responsible office 
for religious affairs, the Ministry of Shar’iyya wa Awqaf, 
was created in 1920. The fusion of religious services 
and politics was abolished on 3 March 1924. However, 
religious practices were still under control of the state 
and administered by, the Directorate of Religious Af-
fairs (The Diyanet), which was attached to the Office 
of the Prime Minister. This juncture aimed “to execute 
the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics 
of Islam, enlighten the public about their religion, and 
administer the sacred worshipping places” under the 
principle of secularism (Presidency of Religious Affairs). 
The Kemalist secular policies such as disestablishment 
of religious education, ban on religious orders, and ban 
on fez and turban accompanied by the introduction of 
western style clothes, all aimed to disestablish political 
power of Islam but they did not aimed to destroy Islam 
(Lewis 2002). It may be argued that the creation of such 
an agency has a preventive effect against certain prac-
tices of religion, which may be caused by traditional 
knowledge as well as exploitation of religion by uncon-
trolled religious establishments. Traditional and fun-
damentalist interpretations of religion and misleading 
knowledge of uneducated religious leaders may lead to 
the exploitation of religious beliefs for personal interest 
and may also lead to wrong practices such as oppres-
sion of women on the basis of incorrect religious knowl-
edge. In the context of Turkish state-building process, 
on the one hand the separation of state and religion 
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did not reduce the importance of religion but limited 
its practice to the private sphere of individual life. On 
the other hand, the creation of the Directorate of Reli-
gious Affairs provided a preventative body against the 
exploitation of religion that has no power to intervene 
in the operations of the political agencies. 
Single Party Regime and Repression 
of Oppositions to Laicism
Nation-building of Turkey under a secular framework 
has been carried by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) 
with the support of civil and military elites. However, 
solidarity and unity of military commanders existed 
during the Independence War have been weakened 
during the 20s. Ex-military commanders such as Rauf 
Orbay, Refet Bele, Kazım Karabekir and Ali Fuat Cebesoy, 
who were personally involved in the Turkish Independ-
ence War, ideologically conflicted with Atatürk and the 
CHP and attempted to form opposition parties. The 
Progressivist Republican Party (Terakki Perver Cumhuri-
yet Fırkası) is established in 1924 but closed in 1926 be-
cause the party actively participated in a plot attempt 
against Atatürk in Izmir (Baskan 2006). 
Another source of opposition and the only remaining 
rival of the CHP about the provision of religious ser-
vices was the religious community as at the era of Ot-
toman Empire all other intermediary bodies between 
state and the public were eliminated (Baskan 2006). 
Mosques and Sufi houses were the most important 
political challengers of the new government and its 
reforms, although they were one of the most impor-
tant allies during the Independence War (Baskan 2006; 
Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1996). Particularly during the War of In-
dependence, religious community; namely Sufi sheiks 
and houses, medrese3 teachers, imams at mosques and 
religious counsellors, were able to organize public, mo-
bilize the resources and affect the ideas of public. At 
the end, as mentioned, Sufi houses were closed and all 
other religious institutions were regulated by a special-
ised agency in the strong state structure. However, Sufi 
houses have continued their existence and remained 
active even after their abolition. They survived and per-
sisted beneath the surface particularly in the suburbs 
and the inner Anatolia (Lewis 2002). Yet, the restrictive 
policies and bans on brotherhoods and religious orders 
forced them to built underground organisations that 
also caused a series of religious rebellions starting with 
3 Refers to old theological seminaries and schools that 
give Islamic religious education
the Şeyh Sait revolt in 1925. Particularly, during the 30’s 
secularization efforts, the sole purpose of which was to 
put an end to the power of organized Islam, became 
very strong (Lewis 2002). All schools for imams and 
preachers were closed by 1932 and prayers started to 
be uttered in Turkish. This resulted in a lack of educated 
religious officials and in some places fanatic conserva-
tives as well as illiterates started to handle a religious 
issue (Lewis 2002) that was one of the main reasons of 
religious revival till 50s. 
In 1930, a new party was established with the support 
of Atatürk in order to pass to a democratic political sys-
tem but evidently political dynamics of the country was 
not yet ready for such a shift and therefore the lifetime 
of the party (Free Republican Party, Serbest Cumhuri-
yet Fırkası) did not exceed a couple of months. The new 
party was established by some of the representatives 
who transferred from the CHP but their efforts to come 
into office were not appreciated by the CHP. Local pub-
lic officers attempted to block the election speech of 
the new part leader, Ali Fethi Okyar, this caused public 
protests against those efforts. The police forces used 
firearms to stop the public protests and amongst the 
many injured, a 14-year-old boy was killed (Özgürel 
2002). As a result, the new party was accused of caus-
ing anarchy and the party announced its closure on No-
vember 1st. 
Laicism, Modernization and Reforms
There was no unified legal code during the Ottoman 
Empire. The legal system was based on both Sharia law 
and Martial law. While the former was dominant in al-
most all spheres of life, the latter was differentiated in 
accordance with legal customs of conquered countries 
and the needs of local societies. For example, while tax 
regulations were based on martial law, the family regu-
lations were based on Sharia law. 
The first radical reforms in Islamic laws in the whole Mus-
lim world took place in Turkey aiming to totally mod-
ernise society as well as improve the status of women 
in society. In this process, the principle of secularism 
provided a suitable atmosphere to eliminate conserva-
tive and restrictive impacts of religious law. The new 
regime under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
esteemed in a duty to improve women’s status in the 
society also to aid in the economic development of the 
new nation-state. According to Atatürk, a country could 
not develop if half of the society (women) stays unedu-
cated and inactive (İçli 2003). 
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In 1924, the dual education system (religious education 
in medres and schools) was unified and women were 
granted equal rights to be educated with men. This 
important step eliminated gender segregation at the 
school system and gave women the same opportuni-
ties as men. The Sharia law was completely abandoned 
and replaced with a translation of the Swiss Civil Code 
in 1926. Under the new Civil Code, polygamy was abol-
ished and monogamy based civil marriages became 
obligatory. Women were granted equal rights with men 
on inheritance, child custody, and divorce. This radical 
introduction of the Civil Code improved women’s sta-
tus in the family as that was the intended aim of Musta-
fa Kemal. According to him, the family was the basis of a 
society and happiness of the spouses in the family was 
a substantial issue because any degeneration in this 
basic institution might lead to the degeneration of the 
whole society (İçli 2003). Therefore, secular law aimed 
to improve woman’s subordinate status caused by sha-
ria law in both family and society and  aimed to guar-
antee equality of spouses . The right to vote and to be 
elected was first granted to Turkish women in 1930 for 
municipal elections and in 1933 they gained the right 
to vote and to be elected in village headman and vil-
lage council elections. Finally in 1934, with an amend-
ment to the constitution, women were enfranchised in 
national elections. Women’s enfranchisement in Turkey 
came before many Western countries such as France 
(1946) or Switzerland (1971) (Özdamar 2002: 50).
A new dress code introduced western type clothing to 
the citizens as a symbol of the modernization of their 
society. According to Atatürk, clothes, which were seen 
as a symbol of backwardness, had to be exchanged for 
modern clothes in order to build the grounds of a mod-
ern society. As a result, religious clothes, particularly the 
fez and turban, were banned and new western clothes 
were introduced. The banning of religious clothes can 
also be seen as an effort to embed secularism in the so-
cietal structure. However, the ban on veiling in universi-
ties did not exist before 1982. This law was made after 
the military coup in 1980 reflecting the military regime’s 
efforts to follow and strengthen the reforms of Atatürk 
and thus to eliminate any signs of political Islam from 
the education system. In short, the Kemalist regime 
emphasised the importance of maintenaning Turkish 
culture and identity, in which Islam was an integral part 
since 8th century A.D. Kemalist ideology urged for the 
limitation of religion to the personal level and removal 
of religious effects from the political life. 
However, how is it that all these radical changes had 
had little resistance from the public and was accepted 
by society? Although it would be a mistake to say that 
there was no resistance or opposition from society, it 
is appropriate to argue that mobilization capacities 
of the existent resistance groups were not well devel-
oped. Moreover, the ruling elite used some tactics to 
eliminate this resistance. Firstly, the establishment of 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs can be considered 
as the continuation of Ottoman pattern which includ-
ed ulema4 into the state apparatus (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 
1996; Aydın 1995). Even though it lost its authority in 
the state bureaucracy, and its role reduced to a basic 
sub-ordinary and administrative one, the acceptance of 
new institutions by the public and religious communi-
ties was much easier. In this way, possible mobilization 
of the Ottoman based ulema was also minimized. In 
fact ulema had long been under the control of the state 
and therefore was not used to the action of opposing 
it (Lewis. 2002). The bigger threat to the new regime 
was the religious brotherhoods, which were independ-
ent from the authority and had a long practice of op-
position besides its mobilizing capabilities. However, 
the composition of the First Grand National Assembly 
was covering all segments of the society including 
those brotherhoods and other religious representatives 
such as sheiks, dervishes, ulema, from all over the coun-
try (Baskan 2006; Lewis 2002). Thus, this representative 
composition provided a certain level legitimation and 
support to the decisions taken by the National Assem-
bly. Thirdly, Islamic symbols were integrated into the 
secular nationalist discourses so to give legitimacy to 
the reforms and diminish the resistance. Terms such as 
jihad and holy war were commonly used to unify and 
mobilise society during the Independence War against 
the occupying forces (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1996). However, 
after the end of the War and secularising reforms of 
1924, brotherhoods started to oppose the new regime. 
In the South East of Turkey a religious Kurdish nation-
alist rebellion, Şeyh Sait Rebellion, broke out in 1925 
which afterwards gave the government legitimation 
to close down all the dervish convents. This was a re-
bellion which was mobilised on the basis of religious 
and Kurdish nationalist reasoning. Confirming Tilly and 
Migdal’s arguments, this rebellion presents a good ex-
ample of the mobilization and organization powers of 
local ‘strong men’. Şeyh Sait, the leader of Naqshbandi 
school of Sufism, was able to mobilize society and to in-
4 Refers to a class of educated Muslim scholars who 
trained on severeal fields of Islamic studies and have a great influ-
ence on Islamic jurisprudence.
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vade four cities of the Eastern Anatolia. In response, the 
government was given extra ordinary powers and the 
Law on the Maintenance of Order was passed and the 
Independence Courts were established in the Eastern 
Anatolia. Both the law and the courts were very effec-
tive in eliminating the rebellion and opposition move-
ments up until 1929. These regulations also gave the 
army a special power to intervene in any kind of anti-
regime movements. Secularisation reforms happened 
in a societal environment, where there was no national 
bourgeoisie. During the Ottoman rule, the possible for-
mation of national bourgeoisie was impeded because 
of the fear that this class may mobilise the society 
against the Ottoman rule (Arslan 2008). In the absence 
of such a class which may be a supporter of the new 
regime, the military played a very important role in pro-
tection of Kemalist values which may be an explanation 
for the future military coups as well. 
Multi Party Regime and Revival of Islam after 1950s
With the transition from a single party to a multi-par-
ty regime, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) which 
was the ruling party of Turkey for over 25 years was 
defeated by the Democrat Party in free and fair elec-
tions. Although the reforms of the new Republic were 
quite successfully adopted, as mentioned before, laic 
policies and reforms unintentionally provoked the un-
derground politicization of Islam by political parties and 
social groups (Karakas 2007). The DP came to the Turk-
ish political scene with its religious discourses. Adnan 
Menderes, party chairman of the DP, openly stated his 
support on extension of religious values and stated that 
the DP freed religion from the pressure of previous ad-
ministrations (Yücekök 1976). By adopting such policy 
through religion, the Democratic Party built a political 
ground in which social and political groups support 
more Islamic ideas to get the opportunity to find their 
place in the parliamentary system (Karakas 2007). Many 
scholars such as Dursun (1995) argue that as a reaction 
to CHP’s repressive policies towards religion, religious 
orders such as Said-i Nursi were strong supporters of 
the DP. Thus, the DP followed a populist policy towards 
religion and provided a lot of freedom for organized re-
ligious activity (Dursun 1995).  On the other hand, Cizre-
Sakallıoğlu (1996) states that instead of Islam being a 
political ideology of the DP, the strategy adopted by 
the DP was more the promotion of religion for electoral 
success and liberation of cultural religious traditions. 
The steps taken by the DP; such as setting up Imam 
Hatip Highschools for educating prayer leaders and 
preachers, or re-establishment of religious broadcasts, 
was not an objective to dismantle the secular state but 
to give respectability to traditional culture and Islam 
(Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 1996). 
Beside its support for religious freedom, the DP started 
to carry on more authoritarian policies in order to sup-
press opposition parties and groups. This authoritarian 
behaviour resulted in a military intervention in 1960 
as the military had been playing the role of safeguard 
of the secular Republic (Arat 2010). So called most lib-
eral Constitution of Turkey by now was drafted by 27 
army officers in 1961. It created checks and balances 
system, brought the superiority of constitution instead 
of superiority of the parliament and expanded civil lib-
erties and freedom of expression. In this relatively free 
environment, the Islamic National Order (Milli Nizam) 
Party was founded in 1970 but immediately closed by 
the constitutional court because it violated the princi-
ple of secularity (Arat 2010). Another party called the 
National Salvation Party superseded the National Or-
der Party and became a coalition partner from 1974 
to 1977 (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1995). This party was one of 
the first legitimate political organizations that justified 
its religious political position to achieve its long term 
ideological purpose of emboldening the role of Islam 
in the scene of Turkish politics (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu 1995). 
To identify the reasons of people’s support to this po-
litical party is not an easy task. Beside its religious and 
traditional identity, its economic and political self place-
ment favouring small and national based manufactur-
ing might be attractive to the people (Weiker 1981). 
With the military coup of 1980, the National Salvation 
Party was closed as all other political parties. 
Another Islamist party—Welfare Party (RP)—which took 
a position against the principle of westernisation and 
laicism, became the main coalition partner in 1995 and 
the leader of the party Necmettin Erbakan became the 
prime minister in June 1996. However, the RP was not as 
radical as the previous Islamist political parties in terms 
of its opposition to the existing system. Particularly, af-
ter coming into office, the policies of Erbakan became 
drastically more moderate. It was also in this period that 
an Islamist bourgeoisie started to grow out. The effect 
of socialist Islam reduced by the end 80s and capital-
ism penetrated into the Islamic ideology. However, dur-
ing the rule of the RP, many of its members stated their 
purpose of bringing the Sharia into the country.  As the 
military considered itself to be the main guardian of lai-
cism, on 28 February 1997 the National Security Council 
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issued an ultimatum asking the government to prevent 
anti-laic activities. This ultimatum has been widely con-
sidered as a post-modern coup. Erbakan’s government 
did not show a satisfying performance to the military’s 
expectations on stricter implementation of Kemal-
ist dress code and secular educational reform (Sezgin 
2003). As a result, Erbakan resigned in June 1997 and 
the RP was closed by the constitutional court in 1998. 
Six members of the party including Erbakan and some 
ministers of state were prohibited from being involved 
in political parties for five years on the basis of evidence 
of their non-secular and anti-laic ideological discourses, 
statements, and actions.5 The Virtue (Fazilet) Party (FP) 
was established before the closure of the RP and after 
the closure it played a substitute role and all the rep-
resentatives of the RP transferred to the FP. However, 
similar to many other Islamist parties, its life time was 
also not very long though this party played a crucial 
role in the formation of two mainstream Islamist parties 
of contemporary Turkish politics: The Justice and De-
velopment Party (AKP) and the Felicity Party (SP). Par-
ticularly, the AKP came into the power as a single party 
government by 2002. 
Millennium and the AKP Government
In 2002 Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) became the political victor and won the majority 
of seats (363/550) in the parliament. Erdoğan’s previous 
anti-laic statements6 and attempts to increase the role 
of Islam in politics during its government have deep-
ened the polarization of public in the country and re-
ceived negative responses from the Kemalist elite and 
the military. It is commonly argued by Kemalist elites 
that the AKP has a secret or closed agenda to transform 
the secular state into an Islamic one (Kuru 2005; Kon-
gar, 2010). In the first term of the AKP, a more moderate 
conservative ideology was followed and a policy to im-
prove its relations with the global powers was carried 
out. Numerous steps were taken for a closer integration 
with the EU. Their success in providing a more stable 
economic growth helped them to respond to popular 
demands of the people (Arat 2010; Sezgin 2003). As a 
result, in 2007, the AKP won the elections with 47% of 
votes and 340 (over 550) seats in the parliament. In its 
5 To see the full text of the decision of the court with 
reasons please visit the website at the URL: 
http://www.belgenet.com/dava/rpdava_g01.html
6 To watch a video on a composition of these statements 
please visit the following website;  
http://www.kontratv.com/259102/akp-ve-laiklik
second term, the AKP changed its policies and started 
to apply more targeted and deterring strategies against 
its opponents. This article argues that ideological roots 
of the policies applied by the AKP are much more com-
plex and deeper than they seem to be.
In Turkey, judiciary, military, state bureaucracy, educat-
ed professionals and the president have always been 
in favour of Kemalist principles, particularly laicism, and 
they always hold a position against the Islamist parties. 
For the first time in the history of Turkish Republic, a 
president with Islamist background, Abdullah Gül, was 
selected in 2007. By placing their candidate in the presi-
dency seat the AKP broke one of the rings of the chain 
among the guards of laicism and made the first step 
in the way for not only restructuring the government 
bodies but also for the new legislation through a more 
Islamic state. As expected, president Gül in his first year 
in office (from August 28, 2007 to August 20, 2008) only 
vetoed 2 of the 116 bills that were sent in for his approv-
al (Haber Aktüel 2008). A second strategy used by the 
AKP, particularly in its second term, has been a policy 
of attrition among the opposition groups namely; the 
military, the judiciary, educated professionals and the 
media. The first claims of the government have been 
the existence of a military organization the so called Er-
genekon, which plans a military coup in Turkey. At the 
time of writing this article, no real evidence has been 
introduced to the public to prove the existence of such 
an organization. Under the framework of the police 
operations against the Ergenekon, elites of opposition 
media, academicians and military officers were arrested 
without demonstrating serious evidence.7 These ar-
rests have been strongly criticized by leading lawyers, 
opposition politicians, and journalists as being illegal 
because of the fact that the reason for the accusation 
has not been stated (Hürriyet Daily News 2011). In ad-
dition to the Ergenekon, many superior military officers 
as well as retired ones have been arrested under the au-
thority of a prosecuting attorney. Beside Ergenekon, the 
claims about so called Balyoz Coup Plan (Balyoz Darbe 
Planı) have been legitimate instruments for the arrests 
of 196 military officers (Usta 2001) but the evidence has 
never been presented to the public under the privilege 
of secrecy on criminal investigations. 
The neutrality of judiciary was interrupted by the gov-
ernment when phone lines of judiciary, politicians and 
Kemalist elite were tapped. Under the framework of 
‘democratic’ reforms on the Supreme Board of Judges 
7 By 14 February 2011, the number of people under arrest 
is reported as 117 (Gazete A24, 2011).
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and Prosecutors, the appointment of the majority of 
members has been transferred to the executive power 
(Ekşi, 2010). On the other hand, pressure was put on 
critical voices from the media in an attempt to silence 
them. The biggest opposition media group of Doğan 
TV Holding was made a subject of heavy tax penalties. 
Erdoğan encouraged not buying the newspapers of 
opposition group media. Combined with the harsh ef-
fects of the Global financial crisis, these actions created 
distrust against state agencies and a chaotic atmos-
phere in Turkish politics.
Besides the activities of coercive penetration and pacifi-
cation of rivals and critical voices, the AKP has also used 
strategies to permeate traditional or religious values 
into the educational system. Not only conservative re-
ligious values have started to be integrated into school 
books but also the overall quota of the theology facul-
ties were drastically increased from 813 in 2007 to 5620 
in 2009 (Ilıcalı 2009; Kotan 2009a). The books for high 
school philosophy courses were revised and changed 
in the way to prioritise the philosophy of religion and 
concept of wisdom (Kotan 2009b). Thus, teachers have 
been required to teach the philosophy of religion and 
to prove the existence of God by using cosmological, 
ontological, and theological proofs (Arat 2010). The 
teachings of religion in the education systems have 
long been used as a feature to bring up new genera-
tions with more conservative values. The conserva-
tive values mostly subordinate women’s status in the 
society and therefore contradict Kemalist ideology. 
Whenever “… the public education system is used to 
legitimise religion and religious values, then the space 
for expanding opportunities for women or for fighting 
against restrictive roles that orthodox interpretations of 
Islam endorse becomes narrower.”(Arat 2010: 874).
It has not always been necessary for the AKP to imple-
ment conservative policies on its own. On the con-
trary, the AKP has long used accommodation policies 
to grant its mostly religious proponents with civil ser-
vice, state bureaucracy, and educational positions. As a 
result, these institutional structures have been imple-
menting and applying those norms actively instead of 
the AKP. According to Arat (2010: 873), “AKP does not 
have to implement a systematic plan to promote tradi-
tional roles sanctioned by religious readings. However, 
religious cadres infiltrating the state bureaucracy and 
the educational institutions propagate these values be-
cause this is part of their socialization”.
Supporting the arguments of this article about the Is-
lamist background of the AKP, some conservative poli-
cies started to be applied addressing the issue of alco-
hol consumption. AKP-backed municipalities took over 
the supervision of alcohol-selling restaurants and cafes 
and put economic and regulative pressures on them. 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs has issued a decree limit-
ing alcohol licenses of restaurants only to chosen dis-
tricts and prohibiting the social clubs of sports teams 
from serving alcohol (Arat 2010; Hürriyet 2005). This 
decree has been subject to profound criticism by op-
position groups, arguing that the AKP is intervening in 
an individual’s private life, trying to impose an Islamic 
lifestyle. 
The first decade of millennium in Turkey witnessed a 
counter state-building project of the AKP against the 
Kemalist principle of laicism. After gaining legitimacy of 
its power by getting elected a second time  in 2007, the 
AKP on the one hand has increased its efforts to elimi-
nate its rivals and on the other hand has widened its 
efforts to place its proponents into the state agencies. 
A deep polarization of society, with the Islamists on 
the one side and the Kemalist laics on the other seems 
beyond doubt. The existence of such a divided atmos-
phere has varying impact on different divisions of the 
society, including women . The issue of veiling and its 
symbolic meaning of political Islam put women at the 
centre of these discussions. Political discussions on the 
promotion of religious norms have left footprints on 
the politics of Turkey, so have the antidemocratic ac-
tions of the government.
Conclusion
Despite the existence of the principle of laicism and 
secularization movement for almost a century, what 
is understood by the identity of Turkish people is still 
that of being a Muslim Turk. In one respect, this demon-
strates that Kemalist ideology did not impose features 
to create an atheist society. On the other hand, religion 
has been accepted as an aspect of Turkish culture but 
its practice has been limited to the private sphere of 
citizens. What was surely rejected by the Kemalist ideol-
ogy was the politicization of Islam as it was seen as the 
main barrier standing in front of the modernization of 
the society.
Tilly and Rokkan’s explanations on the stages of the 
state-building processes—penetration of rivals, stand-
ardization, participation, redistribution—complement-
ed by Barkey’s view on incorporation of rival bodies into 
the centralization of state have been explanatory theo-
ries to the historical phases of Turkish state-building. In 
the early state-building of Turkey, all of these processes 
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have occurred but not in row order. On the contrary, 
each step has taken place simultaneously and comple-
mentary to each other. In accordance with the argu-
ments of Barkey, early periods of Turkish state-building 
witnessed the incorporation of religious institutions 
to the state apparatus. However, on the contrary to 
the analyses of Barkey on the Ottoman Empire period, 
these actions resulted in a certain level of rebellious ac-
tivity. This is due to the fact that some coercive means 
are used during the process of incorporation.
This article argued that state-building of the Kemal-
ist Republic produced a certain level of counter state-
building action after the government of the AKP. The 
argument of counter state-building of the AKP lends 
some support to Rokkan’s concepts of Reformation 
and Counter-Reformation. He argues that the strug-
gles ‘between state and church determined the struc-
ture of politics in the era of democratization and mass 
mobilization three hundred years later’ (Rokkan, 1970: 
116). During the establishment of the Turkish Repub-
lic a Reformation process was hold by the time’s po-
litical power: the CHP. Nowadays, the political scene 
undergoes a Counter-Reformation process. As a sup-
porter of conservative and Islamist trends, the AKP has 
gained power as a reaction to the Kemalist ideology. 
However, the Turkish Republic was built on strong 
secular roots and there is still a strong Kemalist elite 
guarding laicism vis-à-vis the AKP and the newly born 
counter semi-elite group including intellectuals, Is-
lamist bourgeois, and academics. The voices of the 
opponents of the government have started to be si-
lenced by the new state-building ideology causing a 
deeper reaction by those strata of the society. Thus, 
a counter homogenization of public seems to be dif-
ficult to achieve. Instead what seems to be taking 
place today is that of a stage of polarization of Turk-
ish politics and public between nationalist-secularists 
and Islamist-traditionalists. It may be argued that this 
polarization has long been existent but it would not 
be misleading to argue that it has never been as evi-
dent as nowadays. The new dynamics of Turkey make 
it more difficult for citizens to be neutral about the is-
sue of laicism, thereby increasingly forcing them to be 
either laic or Islamist.
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